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I. Preliminary Conceptual Remarks  
I would like to state one important point right at the outset. The 
Catholic Church has always maintained an almost enlightened position 
with respect to evolutionary theory, when one compares it with Christian 
American fundamentalism or its Turkish Islamic counterpart.2  
There are, nonetheless conflicts. I would like to distinguish two 
types of conflict. The first is a doctrinal conflict in which science and 
religion hold conflicting, mutually exclusive, views about a particular 
situation. The most important example of this type of doctrinal conflict 
was seen in the case of Galileo and, to honour him, I term these kinds 
of conflict, Galilean conflicts. The most recent example of such a 
Galilean conflict is the debate surrounding evolutionary theory.  
The second type of conflict is not so much about doctrine itself. 
It is more about scientists’ attempts to refute that religion is a 
phenomenon in its own right. Such explanations are also called 
“naturalistic” or “scientistic”. In this vein, Karl Marx described religion as 
the “opium of the people”, Freud viewed religion as a collective neurosis 
and some modern brain researchers even regard it as an illusion 
produced by the limbic system. Others, in turn, see religion as an 
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 This paper derives from my Ambivalenz und Konflikt. Katholische Kirche und 
Evolutionstheorie, Konstanz (UVK) 2010, parts of which are included in my “The 
Epistemological Roots of Ecclesiastical Claims to Knowledge”, in: Axiomathes. An 
International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems (Dordrecht) 19.4 (2009), 481-508.   
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 During the meeting we got a vivid impression of the latter during a visit at Piri Reis school 
(Muğla) that is part of the Hizmet movement of the Turkish Imam and religious scholar 
Fethullah Gülen. According to Wikipedia the Gülen movement runs over 1000 Charter schools 
around the world, including 130 in the US. The schools are excellently equipped. Furthermore, 
education and science play an important role in Gülen’s somewhat opaque teaching and even 
more opaque political practice. Nonetheless, biology was not mentioned when in a 
propaganda film mathematics and physics were praised. In private conversation one of the 
teachers referred to evolutionary theory as “monkey theory”… – The visit at Piri Reis was, by 
the way, requested as part of the funding by the Turkish Prime Minister’s Promotion Fund. 
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important component of the evolution of social behaviour; while others 
like Richard Dawkins explain religion as a by-product of evolution. As in 
all these approaches religion appears as illusory, I would like to term 
these types of conflicts Freudian conflicts, because the word “illusion” 
appears in the title The Future of an Illusion of Freud’s book on the 
topic.  
II. Galilean Conflicts on Evolution  
The Galileo affair has been a deep embarrassment to the 
Church ever since the second half of the 17th century when it became 
clear to almost everybody in Rome that Copernicanism was far from 
being “philosophically absurd and false” or “heretical”.  
Having become sort of prudent the ecclesiastical authorities 
kept a low profile throughout the first hundred years of Darwinian 
evolutionary theory. They seemed to have learnt their lesson from the 
Galileo Affair and kept their noses out of scientific debates, at least as 
far as making any official announcements about evolutionary theory is 
concerned. This is the more surprising as the topic of human evolution 
as – among other things – also dealing with the nature of man is much 
closer to central tenets of Faith than Copernicanism.  
The first official and explicitly public and path breaking 
statement on evolution by a Church authority is the Encyclical Humani 
Generis, promulgated by Pope Pius XII in 1950. On the whole, this 
Encyclical expresses a rather relaxed position with respect to evolution. 
But although it does not instigate a Galilean conflict it nonetheless does 
intimate possible Galileo-like problems.  
The text is somewhat obfuscated, however, by the low 
epistemological expertise, which has characterized documents of the 
Church up to the present day.  
Talking about empirical science the Pope distinguishes 
between “clearly proved facts” and “hypotheses”. However, as, by 
definition, all universal statements in empirical science are hypotheses, 
it seems more likely that the Pope is actually distinguishing between 
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hypotheses that are strongly supported by empirical evidence and 
hypotheses that lack sufficient empirical evidence.  
In this light, we can say that Pope Pius XII:  
1) accepts evolutionary theory as a scientific theory as long as it 
does not contest  
a) God’s creation of the human soul and b) the monogenic 
origin of mankind (which contradicts all scientific evidence) 
2) The Pope requires that evolutionary “hypotheses” have to be 
“submitted to the judgement of the Church.” Whether this also holds for 
“proved facts”, remains unclear.  
3) does not speak out on whether he thinks that evolution is a 
historical fact of the history of the earth.  
The next pronouncement of the Church concerning evolution 
can be found in the Monitum, a warning against the writings of Jesuit 
palaeontologist Teilhard de Chardin, issued by the Holy Office on June 
30, 1962 and reiterated on July 20, 1981. 
The Monitum clearly illustrates two important points. 1) The 
Church is not interested in engaging in a Galilean conflict about 
evolution and explicitly refrains from interfering with matters of science. 
2) The Church maintains a cautious and expectant position with respect 
to evolutionary theory.  
This caution seems to be thrown to the wind in a famous letter 
by John Paul II to the Pontifical Academy on October 22, 1996. In this 
letter, Pope John Paul II confirms the position taken by Pius XII in 
Humani Generis, but with one decisive qualification: 
“Today, almost half a century after the publication of the 
Encyclical [Humani Generis] new knowledge has led to the recognition 
of the theory of evolution as more than a hypothesis. It is indeed 
remarkable that this theory has been progressively accepted by 
researchers, following a series of discoveries in various fields of 
knowledge. The convergence, neither sought nor fabricated, of the 
results of work that was conducted independently is in itself a significant 
argument in favour of this theory.” 
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But the Pope adds: “theories of evolution which, in accordance 
with the philosophies inspiring them, consider the mind as emerging 
from the forces of living matter, or as a mere epiphenomenon of this 
matter, are incompatible with the truth about man.”  
1) Pope John Paul II acknowledges the theory of evolution to be 
an adequately confirmed theory or, as formulated in Vatican 
epistemological terminology, it has risen above mere “hypothesis” and 
is beginning to be something like a “proven fact”. 
2) He, nonetheless, points to conflict areas. a) the monogenic 
origin of mankind (by implication only, because he confirms in a 
summary way what was said in Humani Generis) and b) God’s direct 
creation of the soul. The thesis of the monogenic origin contradicts 
scientific evidence about the formation of species, while the question of 
the soul is a special conceptual issue that, to the best of my knowledge, 
the pertinent sciences probably are not that concerned about. But that 
the Pope contests the evolution of mind and brain contradicts flatly his 
praise of evolutionary theory in general as well as well confirmed results 
of evolutionary theory, anthropology and palaeontology. 
Given that general policy to get out of the Galilean fire line, it is 
most surprising that recently the Church, in the person of one of its 
most senior Cardinals, seems to have taken up arms again and 
marching head-long back on to this Galilean battlefield. In an article 
(“Finding Design in Nature”) that was published in the New York Times 
on July 7, 2005 Christoph Cardinal Schönborn was widely perceived as 
siding with the most recent incarnation of American Creationism, the so-
called Intelligent Design Theory, ID for short. As this paper focuses on 
epistemological issues, I will not address all of the many other 
interesting aspects of this article but I will concentrate here on two 
pertinent quotations: 
1) “The Catholic Church, while leaving to science many details 
about the history of life on earth, proclaims that the human intellect can 
readily and clearly discern purpose and design in the natural world, 
including the world of living things.”  
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2) “Evolution in the sense of common ancestry might be true, 
but evolution in the neo-Darwinian sense – an unguided, unplanned 
process of random variation and natural selection – is not. Any system 
of thought that denies or seeks to explain away the overwhelming 
evidence for design is ideology not science.”  
As to the first quotation, I should remark that evolutionary 
biology in the course of its 150 years of existence has been able to 
explain thousands of design-like structures in living beings in terms of 
evolution, of which natural selection, as proposed by Darwin, is the 
most important but not the only factor. Before the advent of Evolutionary 
Theory, such structures were believed to have been drafted by an 
omnipotent designer. To answer Cardinal Schönborn’s first point in just 
one sentence: the human intellect, indeed, is able to discern purpose 
and design in the natural word, but explains this scientifically in terms of 
functional adaptations brought about mostly by natural selection. 
As to the second point, tens of thousands of biologists all over 
the world will be astounded to hear that by relying on the two principles 
of evolutionary theory: random variation and natural selection, they are 
ideologists rather than scientists. Taking Cardinal Schönborn’s 
assessment seriously and dismissing random variation and natural 
selection would put an end to both evolutionary biology, and most other 
areas of biology, as we know them today.  
Schönborn’s objections against evolutionary theory are, by the 
way, well known from creationist literature. Their mantra like repetition 
does not get them closer to the truth:  
Both evolutionary biology as well as the philosophy of biology 
have dealt with these objections and have disproved them on countless 
occasions – to no avail.  
Schönborn’s anti-evolutionism does not seem to be an isolated 
position, however. In September 2006 in Castel Gandolfo at a meeting 
on evolution of Pope Benedict with his former students, he praised 
Schönborn’s article in the New York Times this way.  
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„It occurs to me that it was divine providence that lead you, 
Eminency, to write a gloss in the New York Times, to render public 
again this topic and to show, where the questions are.”  
Normally, one finds even behind bizarre positions of the Church 
a rational core. This seems to hold also in this case: 
It is not clear whether Cardinal Schönborn really intended to do 
what he actually did: launching a new Galilean conflict; and whether he 
really wanted to side with ID. There is some evidence that he did not 
want this and that he merely meant to engage in a Freudian conflict but 
that he applied the arguments the proponents of ID implement in their 
Galilean fight against evolutionary theory.  
 
III. Freudian Conflicts on Evolution  
Freudian conflicts arise, when a particular science tries to 
explain away religion as a phenomenon in its own right. They do not 
specifically affect the Catholic Church, but religion in general. 
Therefore, the first task of those who wish to wage a Freudian conflict 
should be to develop an adequate definition, or at least a satisfactory 
characterization, of the concept of religion. So far nobody seems to 
have achieved this and, unfortunately, most of those waging Freudian 
conflicts hardly even acknowledge this as a major problem. The second 
task would be to adduce sufficient scientific evidence in order to 
substantiate their Freudian claims in explaining religion.  
These two defects one finds also in Richard Dawkins’ God 
Delusion. In Chapter 5 (“The Roots of Religion”), it is clear that Dawkins 
has difficulties in pinpointing the direct adaptational value of religion. 
After rejecting explanations based on group selection, Dawkins starts 
with the confession: “I am one of an increasing number of biologists 
who see religion as a by-product of something else” (174). The idea of 
by-product, i.e. the idea that a structure that at some period in time had 
evolved according to certain selective pressures is later used for other 
purposes than the one it was originally selected for, is quite common in 
evolutionary biology. This phenomenon is called “exaptation” of a 
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structure, which is distinct from adaptation. Dawkins goes on to present 
the bold idea that: “natural selection builds child brains with a tendency 
to believe whatever their parents and tribal elders tell them. Such 
trusting obedience is valuable for survival.” (176). Religion is just a by-
product of this brain structure.  
Firstly, to assume that religion is above all or even exclusively 
about “trusting obedience” seems a rather narrow view of a 
monotheistic religion let alone a non-monotheistic religion. Secondly, as 
far as evidence is concerned, Dawkins just presents us nothing else 
than a just-so-story that abounds with “might” “could” and similar 
linguistic indicators of uncertainty and speculation. If natural science 
were conducted in this way, there could be no natural science in the 
sense we know and trust. In fact, Dawkins is much aware of the 
weakness of his position. “I must stress”, he admits “that it is only an 
example of the kind of thing I mean, and I shall come on to parallel 
suggestions made by others. I am much more wedded to the general 
principle that the question should be properly put [i.e. religion as a by-
product of the evolutionary process], and if necessary rewritten, than I 
am to any particular answer.” (174). In response to this, it must be said 
that the very principle of scientific research is that ideas have to be 
supported by evidence. What is virtually missing from Dawkins’ claim is 
the evidence that religion is a “by-product of something else”.  
My criticism of Freudian attacks on evolutionary explanations of 
religion given here has two targets: 1) I would like to contest their claims 
that they have scientifically explained away religion by means of natural 
science. At best they could show some behavioural dispositions for 
religion in humans that are far away from the phenomenal richness of 
religions. Generally we see here the problem of methodological 
naturalism: are the natural sciences the right way of dealing with 
cultural phenomena?  My preliminary answer is: NO. Cultural 
phenomena are much too complex as to allow one-dimensional 
explanations.  
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 2) But I would also like contest the claim that the self 
proclaimed “new atheists” have proven atheism to be true. Even if we 
concede, for arguments sake, that their evolutionary explanation of 
religion was correct, this would only show that humans have the 
corresponding behavioural dispositions (for social cohesion through 
religious symbols, obedience etc.). – A believer could easily answer that 
this only shows God’s wisdom in creation, insofar He/She has created 
us such that it is easy for us to believe in Him/Her.   
